Last week I had the chance to talk about Disruptive Power with Quentin Hardy, the deputy technology editor of the New York Times at the San Francisco World Affairs Council. Here is the video:
Over the coming weeks, on OpenCanada.org, I will be exploring the challenges and opportunities for a new Canadian foreign policy. Ideas for this series are based partly on the 2014 , a conference of next-generation foreign policy leaders organized with . Our book on this topic, due out in December, is . In the interim though, what follows will be a series of posts on the unique moment that we are now presented with — a post-baby boomer leader with a majority mandate to reform Canada’s role in the world. What should a new, 21st century Liberal foreign policy look like?
One of the more fascinating aspects of watching the Liberal platform unfold over the past year has been the tension between its intentional underlying liberalism and the politics of opposition and election policy making.
After many years of Liberal Party handwringing over its identity — Who are we? What do we stand for? — Justin Trudeau and his team used a distinctly liberal approach to shape the platform, an approach markedly different from former Liberal leaders Jean Chretien, Paul Martin and even Michael Ignatieff (full disclosure, I participated in Ignatieff’s policy process). For more than two decades, Liberals had mostly eschewed liberal ideology for a centrist pragmatism. This works well when you are in, or close to, power, but it is less helpful when rebuilding a party, let alone trying to build a movement.
Through this kind of liberalism we get moderate deficits to be used not on national daycare, but family tax cuts and low interest rate deficit spending. We get an uncompromising individual rights based approach to abortion and the niqab. We get a province-up climate strategy. We get democratic reform and a move towards open government. These policies certainly don’t please everyone, but they all fit nicely within a modern liberal construct.
But what does a liberal foreign policy look like, and did Trudeau set one out in his platform?
The particular challenge in the international domain is that in the years since the Liberals were in power the world has changed in some significant ways. While a victorious Trudeau announced to the world that ‘Canada was back,’ this is going to require more than returning to past Liberal policies. It will mean re-imagining a liberal international agenda suited to the 21st century.
Since the end of the Second World War, the foreign policies of most developed western countries have been dominated by the concepts, or ideology, of liberal internationalism: a rules-based, open and transparent global system, whose goal is to protect and enhance the freedom of the individual.
For most of its seven decades, this goal was actualized through state-based multilateral organizations that made liberal internationalism largely synonymous with the big postwar institutions like the UN, World Bank and IMF, and the ICC. While the ideal of liberal internationalism is to protect the rights of individuals, the solutions for over half a century have been decidedly statist. And so to address the problem of landmines we get the Mine Ban Convention, to protect citizens against gross human rights abuses we get the Responsibility to Protect, to stop war crimes, we developed norms of humanitarian intervention. While the challenge of liberal internationalism is individualistic, the solutions for over half a century have been state-based.
Despite many successes in its early years, the past decade has in many cases exposed the inability of these postwar institutions and norms to fulfill the very mandates they were built to advance. The list of recent multilateral policy failures is sobering: Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyoto, non-proliferation, and any number of macro development initiatives.
The reality is the multilateral framework is increasingly out of step with a world where technological proliferation has made power more diffuse, and empowered individuals and non-state groups both to protect, and to harm, themselves. As a result, increasingly Liberal Party internationalism is trapped between liberalism’s core mandate of protecting individual rights and a traditional nation-state approach that can no longer take for granted its traditional primacy.
Because of this new reality, for a renewed Liberal Party foreign policy to be effective, it must imagine a 21st century internationalism, rather than fall back on an idealized worldview of old. Put another way, what does an open, rules-based approach to protecting individual rights and freedoms look like in a world of ISIS, Wikileaks, Snowden, and climate change?
Despite Trudeau’s rhetorical emphasis on renewing Canada’s multilateral presence (which in my view is a very positive first step away from the Harper foreign policy approach), we have yet to see a cohesive articulation of his foreign policy approach.
What do we know about Trudeau’s foreign policy?
On the decision to cease airstrikes against ISIS, while an argument can be made to shift our engagement, it is entirely possible — indeed likely — that a Liberal government would have supported them, as they have supported similar campaigns in previous conflicts.
On Bill C-51, the Liberal position was developed to buttress an anticipated nasty conservative attack should they have voted against it. Even with the proposed amendments, central challenges of cross department and international data sharing are problematic for an open, rules based and individually focused liberal agenda (more on this in a later post in this series).
On the Saudi arms deal, Trudeau’s position was that he wouldn’t cancel it but would review and be more transparent about future deals.
On F-35s, he would cancel and replace them with a potentially cheaper alternative.
On the Syrian refugee crisis, a proposal to accept more, and faster.
On pipelines, a mix of supporting some and not others that ultimately will lead to expansion of oilsands development, while at the same time committing to renew Canada’s contribution to global climate talks.
Perhaps the biggest nod to liberal internationalism has been Trudeau’s qualified support of the TPP, a deal that has unified the America left in opposition. So much so that one of its architects, Hillary Clinton, has actually come out against it in order to solidify the nomination.
Whether or not each of these positions is sound, what’s clear is that there is not an underlying philosophy to bind them together. This is completely understandable when running an election. But frameworks can help when building a governing agenda.
Perhaps the crux of this challenge to find a meaningful modern foreign policy philosophy is found in Trudeau’s strong support of foreign service rejuvenation and renewed multilateral participation. Relative to the Harper government, these are positive adjustments. But simply re-engaging in international organizations that are in dire need of reform is a necessary but not sufficient step in rebuilding our role in the world.
Meaningful renewal requires not just returning to active participation in a 20th century multilateralism, but taking on the principal question for liberal internationalism today: how do the states that built the postwar international system continue to promote and protect the individual in a world where states have diminishing power?
This foreign policy challenge may be daunting, but if taken seriously it would also open a new era of possibility in which the state works to protect the networks on which individuals empower themselves.
The unique opportunity of this Liberal foreign policy moment is to re-imagine liberal internationalism, by figuring out what a rules-based global system for securing individual freedoms looks like in a world that is radically more open, and where power is more diffuse, than when Liberals were last in power. This is the Canada the world needs.
In subsequent posts, I will explore elements of this opportunity further.
Cool! Disruptive Power reviewed in Foreign Affairs alongside the fabulous Data and Goliath by Bruce Schneier.
I have an article in Foreign Affairs on the governance challenge posed by algorithmic decision making: The Violence of Algorithms
The Violence of Algorithms
In December 2010, I attended a training session for an intelligence analytics software program called Palantir. Co-founded by Peter Thiel, a techno-libertarian Silicon Valley billionaire, Palantir is a slick tool kit of data visualization and analytics capabilities marketed to and widely used by the NSA, the FBI, the CIA, and other U.S. national security and policing institutions.
The training session took place in Tyson’s Corner, in Washington, D.C., at a Google-esque office space complete with scooters, a foosball table, and a kitchen stocked with energy drinks. I was taking the course to explore the potential uses of the tool for academic research.
We spent the day conducting a demonstration investigation. We were first given a range of data sets and, one by one, we uploaded them into Palantir. Each data set showed us a new analytic capability of the program: thousands of daily intelligence reports were disaggregated to their core pieces of information and correlated with historical data; satellite images were overlaid with socio-economic, air strike, and IED data. And in this process, the promise of Palantir was revealed: with more data comes greater clarity. For analysts who spend their days struggling to interpret vast streams of data, the Palantir demo was an easy sell.
In our final exercise, we added surveillance data detailing the planned movements of a suspected insurgent. Palantir correlated the location and time of these movements with the planned movements of a known bomb maker. And there the training ended. It was quite obvious that the next step, in “real life,” would be violent. The United States would send in a drone or Special Forces team. We in the demo, on the other hand, just went home.
This program raises many challenging questions. Much of the data used was inputted and tagged by humans, meaning that it was chock full of human bias and errors. The algorithms on which the system is built are themselves coded by humans, so they too are subjective. Perhaps most consequentially, however, although the program being demonstrated was intended to inform human decision-making, that need not be the case. Increasingly, such tools, and the algorithms that power them, are being used to automate violence.
Palantir, which takes its name from the legendary “seeing stone” in J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, is just the latest iteration of the age-old myth of an all-knowing crystal ball. That myth underlies both the rapid expansion of state surveillance and the increasing use of algorithms and artificial intelligence to fight and to govern. For governments, the promise is control over a digital space that is increasing decentralized and complex. But it may come at the cost of the very legitimacy on which we give the state its power.
THE AUTOMATED STATE
Palantir is a window into the state’s thinking about technology. Threatened by the increasing power of perceived nefarious digital actors, Western states have sought to control the network itself—to as they claim in documents leaked by Edward Snowden, “Collect it All; Process it All; Exploit it All; Partner it All; Sniff it All; Know it All.”
The problem, of course, is that digital omniscience is incredibly difficult to accomplish. To even aspire to it, one needs two things: a huge amount of data and the tools to give these data meaning.
First, the massive amount of data. From the Snowden leaks, we know that the U.S. government is tapping into the backbones of our communications systems, servers, and transatlantic wires. It is sniffing wireless signals in cities and implementing broad online and telecoms data mining activities. But this is only the tip of the iceberg.
Wide-area surveillance tools are capable of recording high-resolution imagery of vast areas below them. Starting in 2004, the United States has deployed 65 Lockheed Martin blimps in Afghanistan that provide real-time video and audio surveillance across 100 square kilometers (just over 38 square miles) at a time. These Persistent Threat Detection Systems can record activity below them for periods of up to 30 days. Meanwhile on the ground, vast networks of cameras in our cities are being networked together in police databases and control centers, such as the NYPD Real-Time Crime Center, which processes data from over 6,000 surveillance cameras, as well as license plate readers which provide real-time tracking of vehicle movement.
And, of course, Silicon Valley is in the mix. A company called Planet Labs has recently deployed a network of 100 toaster-sized satellites that will take daily high-resolution images of everywhere on earth. The goal is to launch thousands—a persistent near-real-time surveillance tool, available to anyone online. They call these satellites Doves. A driverless Google car collects nearly 1 GB of data a second about the world around it, and the Internet of things is bringing data collection into our homes. A warning came with a recent Samsung smart TV about discussing “personal or other sensitive information” in its vicinity, as it could be transferred to a third party.
What we are in the process of building is a vast real-time, 3-D representation of the world. A permanent record of us.
But where does the meaning in all this data come from? For this, one needs ever more complex algorithms, automation, machine learning, and artificial intelligence. Such technologies are powering a wide range of new governance tools that can trace and record movements of people, detect patterns, and ascribe risk to behaviors outside of programmed norms, to predicting future events.
And increasingly, such algorithms are used to kill. Russia guards five ballistic missile installations with armed one-ton robots, able to travel at speeds of 45 kilometers (about 28 miles) per hour, using radar and a laser range-finder to navigate, analyze potential targets, and fire machine guns without a human pulling the trigger. The Super Aegis 2 automated gun tower can lock onto a human target up to three kilometers (almost two miles) away in complete darkness and automatically fire a machine gun, rocket launcher, or surface-to-air missile. Unmanned aerial vehicles, ranging from autonomous bombers to insect-sized swarm drones, are increasingly able to collect and process data and kill on their own.
The pretense is that these capabilities are reserved for war zones. But the pervasive nature of these tools, combined with the expanding legal mandates of the war on terrorism, means that battlefield capabilities are creeping into domestic policing and governance, often in the legal gray areas of borders. For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security tethered a wide area surveillance blimp 2,000 feet above the desert in Nogales, Arizona. On its first night in use, the system identified 30 suspects who were brought in for questioning. There are now calls to redeploy the 65 surveillance blimps used in Iraq and Afghanistan to U.S. Customs and Border Protection to patrol the U.S.-Mexico border.
The consequence of the growing capabilities for algorithmic governance and violence are significant. First, acts of war have become spatially and conceptually boundless. The once legally and normatively established lines between war and peace and between domestic and international engagement are disappearing.
Second, digital representation, and the biases, values, and ambiguities that are built into it, are becoming acts of governance and violence themselves, rather than simply contributors to them. This is leading us to a place of predictive governance, based on unaccountable and often unknowable algorithms. Although the United States currently has a directive that humans must be a part of any fatal decision in war, this ignores all of the algorithm-based decisions that lead up to this ultimate point. If they are biased, flawed, or based on incorrect data, then the human will be just as wrong as the machine.
Third, spaces of dissent in society are being eroded. Those pushing the bounds of what is deemed acceptable behavior are increasingly caught within the grasp of algorithms meant to identify deviancy. We are already seeing changes in behavior among investigative journalists and activists. At a recent Columbia School of Journalism event in a series called “Journalism After Snowden,” the editors of The New York Times, The Washington Post, and Politico detailed the challenges of protecting sources in an environment of increasing state surveillance and the effect it has on their ability to do accountability reporting. Acts of digital civil disobedience are increasingly being targeted and prosecuted not as protest but as terrorism. When punishments are vastly disproportionate to crimes, then an important democratic function is lost.
Finally, as author Daniel Suarez argues, a combination of automated remote force deployment and artificial intelligence could allow the state to kill preemptively and anonymously. This is a path to automated war, and a harbinger of a recentralization of power. A path that requires us to have a serious conversation about the power and accountability of algorithms deployed by both state and corporate actors.
THE PERILS OF ALGORITHMIC GOVERNANCE
The modern state system is built on a bargain between governments and citizens. States provide collective social goods, and in turn, via a system of norms, institutions, regulations, and ethics to hold this power accountable, citizens give states legitimacy. This bargain created order and stability out of what was an increasingly chaotic global system.
If algorithms represent a new ungoverned space, a hidden and potentially ever-evolving unknowable public good, then they are an affront to our democratic system, one that requires transparency and accountability in order to function. A node of power that exists outside of these bounds is a threat to the notion of collective governance itself. This, at its core, is a profoundly undemocratic notion—one that states will have to engage with seriously if they are going to remain relevant and legitimate to their digital citizenry who give them their power.
The following was in the San Fransisco Chronicle, on May 1
Why the U.S. should but won’t partner with hactivists Anonymous
For a barbaric movement grounded in early Islamic apocalyptic prophecies, what is perhaps most striking about the rapid rise of the Islamic State has been its use of modern technology. Leveraging the open nature and global reach of platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, Islamic State has used social media to recruit young would-be jihadis, to build a global network of sympathetic followers, and to intimidate Western audiences with its brutality.
The scale of this digital propaganda network is vast. A recent study by the Brookings Institution found that in late 2014 there were at least 46,000 Twitter accounts used by Islamic State supporters, with an average of 1,000 followers each.
But why has the United States, which has at its disposal vast cyberwar capabilities, an ever-expanding surveillance state and significant leverage over, and goodwill of, the American companies that are hosting this content, proved unable to quiet the online reach of this network of insurgents?
One answer is that the open nature of the Internet, combined with the constraints that democratic states face engaging effectively within it, has limited the capability of the United States to fight back. And this tells us a tremendous amount about the shifting nature of power in the digital age.
In the absence of effective state action against the Islamic State online, Anonymous has taken up the digital war. Already this ad hoc network of hackers and activists has downed scores of Web pages and hacked into dozens of Twitter accounts that allegedly belong to Islamic State members. Much like in the early days of the Arab Spring, where hackers provided online assistance and offered protection to activists, Anonymous is stepping in where the state has limited capacity.
This has recently led to calls for the United States to partner with Anonymous to launch cyberattacks against the Islamic State, and even paying hactivists in bitcoin. This sounds audacious, but plausible. Western governments have long collaborated with unsavory actors with the aim of larger strategic goals — as it is said, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
In theory, such a partnership could allow the Defense and State departments to overcome the constraints of their slow-moving, hierarchical, command-and-control systems. It could allow them to act more like a nimble startup than a legacy industrial corporation.
And it could be effective — we know that Anonymous hackers have been successful taking on a wide range of both established and emerging powers. In practice, however, there is substantial risk. As the failure of the clandestine USAID program to build a fake version of Twitter in Cuba to foster dissent demonstrates, states often stumble when they step into the murky world of online power.
But I would suggest there are other, more fundamental reasons, why the U.S. will never partner with Anonymous. This is because, at its core, Anonymous is different than the other perceived bad actors that government is more than willing to collaborate with. Anonymous represents a new form of decentralized power that challenges the very foundations of the state system.
First, the power structures that Anonymous embodies represent a fundamental threat to state dominance in the international system. The challenges that the state system were designed to solve — a lack of structure, instability, decentralized governance, loose and evolving ties — are precisely what makes groups like Anonymous powerful.
Legitimizing the type of decentralized, collaborative and anonymous power that Anonymous represents, therefore poses a threat to the hierarchical and state-led international system that the nation state depends on. This new form of power scares governments — so much so that they are willing to exert significant control over the network itself. As was revealed in the Snowden National Security Agency documents, the government wanted to collect it all, process it all, exploit it all, partner it all, sniff it all, know it all.
Second, over the course of modern history, we have placed tremendous power in the state. Whether it be through the justice system, the social welfare state or the military, government has been the primary enabler of collective action in our society. In exchange, we have put in place systems of accountability and laws to hold this power to account. For states seeking to fight new online powers, these norms of behavior make functioning effectively online at best difficult, and at worst counter to the expectations and laws governing their activities.
Third, the state is ultimately faced with a paradox — that the very attributes of the Internet that enable the Islamic State also enable the free enterprise and expression that make it arguably the most liberating technology in human history. The very real risk governments face is that in seeking to stop perceived nefarious actors online, they will also shut down the positive ones. Efforts by the NSA to break encryption, for example, won’t just help it fight illegal crypto-currencies, or Islamic State fighters using secure networking tools, but would also threaten the security of the online commerce sector. These efforts risk breaking the Internet.
For the U.S. government, partnering with Anonymous and legitimizing its structure is simply a bridge too far. And this limitation represents a crisis for state power in the digital age: One that curtails its ability to fight the online propaganda of a barbaric jihadist movement taking to Twitter to build its caliphate.
The essay below was in the Globe and Mail on April 10th.
On Jan. 28, 2011, in the middle of a popular uprising, the president of Egypt turned off the Internet. This striking display of state power is well known. Less well known is how the Internet was turned back on.
Around the world, hackers and activists who belong to a collective known as Telecomix began to re-establish network connections in Egypt. They arranged with a hacker-friendly French Internet service to provide hundreds of dial-up modem lines, sought out amateur-radio enthusiasts to broadcast short logistical messages, faxed leaflets to university campuses and cyber cafés explaining how to get around the blackouts, and used the same tactic to get news out of Egypt.
Telecomix is one of a new breed of actor taking part in international conflict. When the Arab Spring moved to Syria, this new breed included hackers from Anonymous who took down government infrastructure, crisis mappers who crowd-sourced the analysis of tank locations, citizens who streamed the bombardment of cities to YouTube, and networks of amateur experts who used these videos to trace the origins of munitions.
These groups do not fit comfortably in traditional categories: They are not nation-states, formal institutions or rogue individuals. Instead, they share characteristics and capabilities that are fundamentally technology-enabled.
They are formless. You can’t join them, because they are not organizations; you can’t lead them, because there is no leader; and most engage while cloaked in encryption and pseudonyms. All this stands in direct contrast with the hierarchical structures that give traditional institutions strength.
So how are we to understand those who have strength without structure? First, by realizing that they gain power because of, rather than in spite of, being decentralized and non-hierarchical.
Also, in a networked model, new actors require no one else to attain status – action, not affiliation, produces credibility and authority. Their identities derive from what they do and from the impact they have. As Swedish academic Jenny Sunden puts it, on the Internet, one “types oneself into being.”
We are so used to equating organization with hierarchy that it comes as a surprise that disparate groups are even capable of joint ventures. But new forms of ad hoc governance are emerging to regulate collective behaviour, including the Pirate Party’s notion of liquid democracy and the way in which Anonymous uses chat rooms to mobilize and co-ordinate its members.
In fact, the way power is exercised in the digital space presents a crisis for the state. First, states no longer have a monopoly on the ability to shape the behaviour of large numbers of people.
Second, while governments have all the legacy burdens of other hierarchical 20th-century institutions (lethargy, waste, layers of bureaucracy, slow adaptation), unlike private companies, they cannot simply go bankrupt. When Tesla disrupts Ford, we may end up with better cars, but when governments are challenged, we risk losing the collective social goods they were built to ensure.
Third, because groups like Anonymous are empowered by lack of structure and other “problems” the modern nation state was designed to overcome, the result is a misalignment of the norms and institutions that govern the international system and the mechanisms that increasingly create power.
Finally, what empowers digital players that are perceived to be nefarious is the same as what leads free expression, knowledge creation and economic development to flourish online. By targeting the Internet and digital networks, states also risk shutting down all the positive benefits that they allow: They risk breaking the network itself.
One of the central challenges of this century will be determining whether the norms of behaviour, democratic processes and mechanisms of accountability through which we give the state legitimacy will thrive in this new international ecosystem. This will require leadership from governments themselves.
Our current global institutions were designed by, built for and are run by those who had power in the 20th century. But what would an international organization look like that included those with power in the digital world, such as Anonymous and Telecomix?
States also must work to protect the notion of a single Internet. The social and economic good that comes from an open, secure and free Internet far outweighs the actions of perceived enemies. This means scaling back the rapidly growing surveillance state and rethinking actions that threaten the very capacity of the online system, such as efforts to break encryption. Rather than treating the Internet as a battlefield it must control, the state should be working to support the very technologies that empower and protect so many.
This will entail accepting new norms of self-regulation and network governance and determining effective ways of bringing the values of the democratic nation-state into these new processes, rather than seeking to control them.
There remains an alternate temptation, however: seeking absolute control of the digital ecosystem. This mentality underlies much of the Canadian government’s proposed counterterrorism law, Bill C-51. By giving sweeping new surveillance powers to both security services and domestic police, these policies not only threaten the network infrastructure that benefit so many, but risk suffocating the spaces for dissent on which social and political progress are built.
The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended almost a century of instability and conflict between disparate empires. Once absolute ruling powers, these empires were losing control over both their territory and their citizens. By legitimizing the state rather than the crown as the primary sovereign unit, the treaty created order out of chaos.
We face a similar moment today. Yet to be seen is whether a digitally enabled world can undergo a similar restructuring without the loss of the chaos, messiness and disorder that generate its power.
The following oped was in the Globe and Mail last Friday. It is a response to the news of a new digital diplomacy initiative at the Munk School of Global Affairs funded by the Canadian Government. While i think the intention of the program and likely many of the initiatives it will produce are to be lauded, it really must be evaluated alongside the wide range of often contradictory digital foreign policy initiatives. The core argument below is drawn from a chapter on Digital Diplomacy in my forthcoming book.
At 5 a.m. on Friday, Sept. 7, 2012, five Canadian diplomats stationed in Tehran quietly left the country. After years of increasing tensions and rhetoric Canada cut all diplomatic ties with Iran.
But as Canada was cutting its formal diplomatic ties with Iranian officials, a separate team within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was working with the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto to build an online platform where Iranians could discuss their upcoming election. If Canadian diplomats could not speak to Iranian officials, they were going to help Iranians speak to one another.
This week’s announcement of an expanded digital diplomacy initiative based at the Munk School of Global Affairs is being positioned as an expansion of this “public square” initiative. And as an extension of the traditional public diplomacy once practised on TV and radio (think Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and BBC World Service) onto the Internet.
But it is, in fact, a far more assertive act, one of making foreign policy rather than simply communicating it. Such programs are part of a growing attempt by the state to remain relevant in a world of increasingly decentralized power.
Whereas states were once the primary means of incentivizing collective action and asserting power on the international stage, they are now being challenged by a wide range of individuals and groups who are using digital technology to organize, protest, report, aid each other, trade, and at times attack. Whether they be hackers, digital humanitarians, cryptocurrency innovators, activists, citizen reporters, or terrorists, the Internet allows people to take on the institutions that once held a monopoly on power.
Digital diplomacy is therefore part of the state’s attempt to remain relevant and to assert power in the digital space. And while the goals of any one initiative might be lauded (as this one can), we need to view and ultimately assess it as only one component of a wider suite of digital foreign policy actions. Taken as a whole, digital foreign policy is fraught with challenges and hypocrisies.
First, such seemingly innocuous initiatives often backfire. Take, for example, USAID’s elaborate scheme to create a Cuban version of Twitter with the goal of fostering dissent and promoting regime change. While an innovative and audacious use of digital technology to achieve a (however misguided) State Department objective, the revelation of the program tainted the reputation and hurt the effectiveness of USAID as a whole.
Second, the platforms and tools being built through initiatives like the Iran Dialogues, replicate or use the very anonymizing capabilities that our national intelligence agencies are simultaneously seeking to break and undermine. The ability to communicate anonymously empowers perceived nefarious and legitimate actors alike, whether they be terrorist, black market commerce sites, domestic protesters, or dissidents in Iran. Programs seeking to break encryption will ultimately negate any well-intentioned digital diplomacy initiatives.
Third, digital foreign policy is increasingly being outsourced. Governments distance themselves from acts of hacking or cyberwar through the use of arm’s-length organizations. Whether it be the Syrian Electronic Army, the recent North Korea hack, or the U.S. and Canada using think tanks to build digital tools, it is getting increasingly hard to attribute online action and to hold it accountable.
Finally, the same governments that are seeking to enable free speech in countries like Iran are at the same time rapidly expanding the surveillance state. Thanks to the revelations of Edward Snowden we now know how the state has chosen to respond to this new space of digital empowerment. Like a traditional battlefield, they are seeking to control it. To, as they themselves claim, “know it all.”
And herein lies the central tension in the digital diplomacy initiative. By seeking to control, monitor and undermine the actions of perceived negative actors, the state risks breaking the very system that positively empowers so many. And this will ultimately harm those living under autocratic and democratic regimes alike.
The answer, unfortunately, is not as simple as many critics of digital diplomacy assert. Simply returning to traditional in-person diplomacy ignores the global shift to decentralized digital power. Digital diplomacy is a well-intentioned attempt to participate in this new space. However, it is one that is both ill-suited to the capabilities of the state, and is negated by other digital foreign policy programs.
We are at the start of a reconfiguration of power. Navigating this terrain is one of the principal foreign policy challenges of the 21st century.
My forthcoming book, Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age, is now available for pre-order on Amazon. Official launch is March 1, and will be touring internationally throughout March and April. Lots more details soon. Blurb from OUP is below:
Anonymous. WikiLeaks. The Syrian Electronic Army. Edward Snowden. Bitcoin. The Arab Spring. Digital communication technologies have thrust the calculus of global political power into a period of unprecedented complexity. In every aspect of international affairs, digitally enabled actors are changing the way the world works, and disrupting the institutions that once held a monopoly on power. No area is immune: Humanitarianism, War, Diplomacy, Finance, Activism, or Journalism. In each, the government departments, international organizations and corporations who for a century were in charge, are being challenged by a new breed of international actor. Online, networked and decentralized, these new actors are innovating, for both good and ill, in the austere world of foreign policy. They are representative of a wide range of 21st century global actors and a new form of 21st century power: disruptive power.
In Disruptive Power, Taylor Owen provides a sweeping look at the way that digital technologies are shaking up the workings of the institutions that have traditionally controlled international affairs. What is it that makes for successful digital international action? What are the tools being used by the actors increasingly controlling international affairs? How does their rise change the way we understand and act in the world? What constitutes effective online international action? What are the negative consequences of a radically decentralized international system? What new institutions will be needed to moderate the new power structures and ensure accountability. And how can governments and corporations act to promote positive behaviour in a world of disruptive innovation? Owen takes on these questions in this survey of the frontier of international affairs, a world enabled by information technology, and increasingly led by disruptive innovators.
With cutting edge analysis of the fast-changing relationship between the declining state and increasingly powerful non-state actors, Disruptive Power is the essential road map for navigating a networked world.
Cross posted on www.towcenter.org
Long a figment of technophile imagination, a confluence of technological advances has finally placed in-home virtual reality on the cusp of mainstream adoption. Media attention and developer interest have surged, powered by the release of the Oculus Rift to developers, the anticipated launch of Samsung’s Gear VR, rumored headsets from Sony and Apple, and a cheeky intervention from Google called Cardboard; a simple VR player made of cardboard, Velcro, magnets, a rubber band, two biconvex lenses and a smartphone.
We now have the computational power, screen resolution and refresh rate to play VR in a small and inexpensive headset. And within a year, VR will be a commercial reality. We know that users will be able to play video games, sit court-side at a basketball game and view porn. But what about watching the news or a documentary? What is the potential for journalism in virtual reality?
Virtual reality is, of course, not new. A generation of media and tech researchers used both cumbersome headsets or VR ‘caves’ to experiment with virtual environments. Research focused mostly on how humans engage with virtual environments when the mind tricked them into thinking they are real. Do we learn, care, empathize and fear as we do in real life? Do we feel more? This research is tremendously important as we enter a new VR age; out of the lab and into peoples’ homes.
In addition to the headsets, a second technology is set to transform the VR experience. While initial uses of the Oculus Rift and similar devices have focused on computer generated imagery (gaming) and static 360° images (such as Google Street View), new experimental cameras are able to capture live motion 360° and 3D virtual reality footage.
The kit is made from 12-16 cameras mounted to a 3D printed brace, and then stitched onto a virtual sphere to form a 360 degree virtual environment. While 360 cameras have been around for years, these new kits are also stereoscopic, adding depth of field. They are not yet commercially available, but several are in production, including one by startup Jaunt and another by NextVR that uses six extremely high resolution Red Epic Dragon cameras. We are working with the media production company Secret Location who have also built a prototype, pictured below.
This new camera technology opens up a tremendous opportunity for journalists to immerse audiences in their story and for audiences to experience and connect to journalism in powerful new ways. And this is the focus of a new Tow Center Research project studying and prototyping live motion virtual reality journalism
The project is a partnership between Frontline, The Secret Location, and the Tow Center. James Milward, the CEO of the Secret Location is leading the production, Raney Aronson, the Deputy Executive Editor of Frontline is leading the field experiment and shoot, Dan Edge is taking the camera into the field, and I am leading the research. Together, along with Pietro Galliano, Sarah Moughty and Fergus Pitt, we will be running the demo project and authoring a Tow Brief to be published in partnership with MIT documenting the process and lessons learned.
The project recently won a Knight Foundation Prototype Grant.
In short, this project explores the extension of factual film making onto this new platform. Unlike other journalistic VR work, such as the pioneering project by Nonny de la Pena, which has relied on computer-generated graphics, this project will be centered on live video, delivering an experience that feels more like documentary and photo journalism than a console game. There are few examples of this type of journalism. The one that comes closest would Gannett’s recent project for the Oculus Rift called Harvest of Change.
The first phase of the Tow Center VR project has several components.
First, we are testing the equipment needed to capture live motion virtual reality footage. This includes a prototype 360/3D camera and surround sound audio recording. We recently held a training session for the camera at the Secret Location Toronto office.
Twelve GoPros mounted in a 3D printed brace.
The 360° stereoscopic camera, with directional microphone.
Second, we are deploying this video and audio equipment to the field on a story about the Ebola outbreak being directed for Frontline by Dan Edge, a renowned documentary film-maker. This phase will test how the camera can be used in challenging environments. But crucially, it will also explore new journalistic conventions. How do you tell a story in VR? What does narrative look like? Dan is currently in Guinea with the camera and he will be traveling to Liberia and Sierra Leon in early 2015.
Third we will then be testing new post-production VR processes, including the addition of interactivity and multimedia into the VR environment.
The demo will be launched in the spring alongside the release of the feature Frontline documentary and with an accompanying report documenting the experiment and what we have learned. We will also be hosting apanel on VR journalism and this year’s SXSW featuring James Milward, Nonny de la Pena, and head of Vice News, Jason Mojica.
We are all acutely aware that this emerging practice, while exciting, presents some challenging questions.
For the practice of journalism virtual reality presents a new technical and narrative form. It requires new cameras, new editing and shooting processes, new viewing infrastructure, new levels of interactivity, and can leverage distributed networks in new ways. In addition to these technical innovations, an emerging scholarly discourse is exploring how virtual reality also challenges traditional notions of narrative form. Virtual reality, combined with the ability to add interactive elements, changes the positionality of the journalists, breaking down the fourth wall of journalism. Storytelling is pulled from its bound linear form, and moved to a far more fluid space where the audience has new (though still limited) agency in the experience of the story. This changes how journalists must construct their story and their place in it, and challenges core journalistic assumptions of objectivity and observation. It also changes how audiences engage with journalism, bringing them into stories in a visceral experiential manner not possible in other mediums.
CBC The Current Interview on Virtual Reality Journalism with Taylor Owen and Nonny de la Pena
More conceptually, virtual reality journalism also offers a new window through which to study the relationship between consumers of media and the representation of subjects. Whereas newspapers, radio, television and then social media each brought us closer to being immersed in the experience of others, virtual reality has the potential to further break down this distance. A core question is whether virtual reality can provide similar feelings of empathy and compassion to real life experiences. Recent work has shown that virtual reality can create a feeling of ‘social presence,’ the feeling that a user is really there, which can create far great empathy for the subject than in other media representations. Others have called this experience ‘co-presence,’ and are exploring how it can be used to bridge the distance between those experiencing human rights abuses and those in the position to assist or better understand conflict.
It is our hope that this initial project, as well as a planned larger multiyear research project, will begin to shed light on some of these questions.
This Walrus magazine article provides some further background to the project.
The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age
Anonymous. WikiLeaks. The Syrian Electronic Army. Edward Snowden. Bitcoin. The Arab Spring.
Digital communication technologies have thrust the calculus of global political power into a period of unprecedented complexity. In every aspect of international affairs, digitally enabled actors are changing the way the world works and disrupting the institutions that once held a monopoly on power. No area is immune: humanitarianism, war, diplomacy, finance, activism, or journalism. In each, the government departments, international organizations and corporations who for a century were in charge, are being challenged by a new breed of international actor. Online, networked and decentralized, these new actors are innovating, for both good and ill, in the austere world of foreign policy. They are representative of a wide range of 21st century global actors and a new form of 21st century power: disruptive power.
In Disruptive Power, Taylor Owen provides a sweeping look at the way that digital technologies are shaking up the workings of the institutions that have traditionally controlled international affairs. The nation state system and the subsequent multinational system were founded on and have long functioned through a concentration of power in the state. Owen looks at the tools that a wide range of new actors are using to increasingly control international affairs, and how their rise changes the way we understand and act in the world. He considers the bar for success in international digital action and the negative consequences of a radically decentralized international system. What new institutions will be needed to moderate the new power structures and ensure accountability? And how can governments and corporations act to promote positive behavior in a world of disruptive innovation? Owen takes on these questions and more in this probing and sober look at the frontier of international affairs, in a world enabled by information technology and increasingly led by disruptive innovators.
With cutting edge analysis of the fast-changing relationship between the declining state and increasingly powerful non-state actors, Disruptive Power is the essential road map for navigating a networked world.
“The 21st century state is using new technologies both to serve and protect citizens and also to control them. Citizens are using the same technologies to fight back. Taylor Owen’s analysis is the one you want to read on this battle and the way it will shape the 21st century.”
–Michael Ignatieff, Edward R. Murrow Professor of Practice, Harvard Kennedy School
“Cyber technology has led to disruptive power in the form of hackers like Anonymous and crypto-currencies like Bitcoin. How should states respond? Taylor Owen offers a provocative analysis and recommendations.”
–Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Harvard University, author of The Future of Power
“In Disruptive Power, Owen gives us a tour of the digital challenges to the nation-state, from newly flexible protest groups like Occupy and Anonymous to the rise of algorithms as weapons, often in the hands of non-state actors and often targeting civilian life. He weaves these observations into a forcefully argued thesis: the model of a world governed by stable nation-states is in crisis, forcing most state-led institutions into a choice between adaptation and collapse.”
–Clay Shirky, author of Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations
“Taylor Owen gives us an incisive set of reflections on the ways in which the decentralized, collaborative, and resilient power of digital networks is undermining the state’s ability to govern. Even more disturbing is the resulting existential dilemma for democratic states: the best way to fight back is to become a surveillance state. Disruptive Power does not provide answers, but it poses important and unsettling questions.”
–Anne-Marie Slaughter, Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University, and Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department, 2009-2011
Media and Book Talks
The Violence of Algorithms, Foreign Affairs
Why the U.S. should but won’t partner with hactivists Anonymous, San Fransisco Chronicle
Why governments must embrace the new global digital reality, The Globe and Mail
The promise and peril of digital diplomacy, The Globe and Mail
More Data, More Problems: Surveillance and the Information Economy, Review in Foreign Affairs
Rescuing Democracy in the Age of the Internet, Review in Ethics and International Affairs
CIGI Signature Lecture, Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age
World Affairs Council, San Fransisco: From Bitcoin to WikiLeaks: Shaping the World in the Digital Age
Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum, Plenary Session: Foreign policy in 140 Characters: How technology is redefining diplomacy
International Conference of Crisis Mappers: Historical Mapping and the US Bombardment of Cambodia
Highlights from a talk at USC Annenberg: Disruptive Power
Losing Control outlines how in a wide range of international areas of influence, the state is being challenged by new, digitally enabled actors. Grounded in the theory of disruption, this chapter explores the rise and power of the activist collective Anonymous, the paradox of dual use surveillance technologies, and the recent revelation on the extent of NSA surveillance. The chapter serves as an introduction to the book.
Disruptive Power traces the development of the modern state and drawing on disruption theory, explores how the introduction of digital technology presents a crisis to state power. The state began as a mechanism for centralizing and exercising power and over time became hierarchical, bureaucratic, and, in democratic states, accountable to the rule of law. In a networked world, however, groups like Anonymous wield power by being decentralized, collaborative, and resilient. These two models of power are fundamentally at odds and the resulting disruptive power threatens the institutions that have preserved the balance of power since the end of World War II.
Spaces of Dissent
Spaces of Dissent explores the rapidly evolving space of digital activism, or hacktivism, through the example of a group of hackers called Telecomix, who served as a form of tech support for the Arab Spring. Such cyber activists have taken on a role of social and cultural provocateurs; they are dissenting actors in a culture that is increasingly hostile to protest. What’s more, they see, observe, and quickly react in ways that boggle the state and corporations – all of this instrumentalized by digital technology. This argument is grounded in an exploration of hactivism as a form of civil disobedience, though one that looks markedly different, and is potential more powerful, than the placards and megaphones of old. The chapter details how the state has responded to the perceived threat of online civil disobedience through its prosecutions against Chelsea Manning and Anonymous, and argues that their excessiveness stems form a paranoia over losing control. Finally, it explores the costs to society when we eliminate social deviancy.
New Money details how the rise of crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin represent a threat to the power the state derives from the control of currency. This chapter first outlines the history of the close connection between the control of currency and state power. It then details the rise of crypto-currencies, explain how they work, and their potential real-world benefits. Finally, it explores the potential challenge to state power posed by this decentralized and technologically enabled currency. I argue that if the use of Bitcoin were to proliferate, as it likely will, then the inability of the state to either collect revenue from, or regulate commercial activity, poses a threat to the control it currently holds over the international financial system.
Being There considers the evolution of international reporting news by juxtaposing the death of seasoned war corresponded Marie Colvin during the bombing of Homs, Syria with the new digital tools Syrian citizens used to document and stream the war to the world in real time. In an age of live-streaming, citizen journalism, drone journalism and coming advances in virtual reality, do we even need foreign correspondents? What’s more, do these technological advances result in new forms of knowing and understanding international events, do they shift how we understand the traditional power of the media and their capability to control information, and are they ultimately affecting how we see, and act in, the world?
Saving the Saviors
Saving the Saviors looks at the impact of collaborative mapping and advances in satellite technology on humanitarian and development agencies. The world of aid, humanitarianism and development have long been dominated by state-based agencies and large international organizations. For nearly a century, organizations like the World Food Program, The Red Cross, USAID and Oxfam have attempted to lead a transfer of expertise and resources from the developed world to the developing world. But new models are emerging. In the first week following the 2010 Haiti earthquake 14,000 citizens used their cell phones to upload emergency information to a live online crisis map. How do we know if the information uploaded to a crisis map is real? How do we hold these projects to account, without the oversight that states and institutions once provided? Using examples of disruptive humanitarian actors and recent academic work assessing their impact, this chapter explores how aid and humanitarianism are being transformed from the ground up.
Diplomacy Unbound explores the emerging practice of digital diplomacy. First, it outlines how we valued the efficacy and power of diplomacy before Twitter and Facebook and mesh networks by tracing the notion of diplomatic power. It then argues that we need to view digital diplomacy initiatives in two categories, those that simply expand the practice of public diplomacy into a new medium, and those that seek to fundamentally engage in the digital space, using the tools and capabilities outlined throughout this book. I argue that when the bounds of diplomacy are extended into influencing not just states, but also digital actors, then they overlap fundamentally with other foreign policy programs and objectives. And this invariably leads to conflicting methods and outcomes. The undue negative costs associated with coercive digital diplomacy demonstrate the weakness of the state in a major realm of its foreign policy. And if the state can’t be effectively diplomatic in the digital space, then what does this tell us about the contemporary relevance of diplomacy itself?
The Violence of Algorithms
The Violence of Algorithms looks at how advances in computational power and automation have produced military weapons and surveillance tools that blur the boundaries of the battlefield and the lines between domestic and international. While much of this book focuses on diminishing state power in the face of empowered actors, here I look at how the state is fighting back. What does it mean when the state extends the use of military technologies and tactics far beyond the battlefield? How should we view advances in automated warfare, and the power that these new technologies embed in complex and secretive algorithms? And for how long can we expect the state to have a monopoly on these news forms of pervasive violence? Put another way, where is the line between war and peacetime behaviour with the deployment of computation and surveillance based weaponry?
The Crisis of the State
The Crisis of the State outlines four challenges that together threaten the state’s traditional mechanisms of power and control, but that also might provide models for 20th century international institutions seeking to adapt— if they are structurally capable of transformation or meaningful reform. This crisis of the state has at least four key components: democratic legitimacy, reversing the surveillance state, algorithmic accountability, and internet governance. Solving any one of them, will not prove a panacea to this crisis, nor is this list exhaustive; there are many more innovations being developed and important questions being addressed. But luckily in each, there are individuals and groups experimenting on new models and proposing potential solutions. This is the new landscape in which the state must constructively engage.
- I am Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia
- I am a Senior Fellow at the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at the Columbia School of Journalism. I was previously the Research Director, where I led a research program on digital technology and journalism.
- I am the author, most recently, of Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age (Oxford University Press, 2015) and the co-editor of The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink its Foreign Policies (University of Toronto Press, 2015, with Roland Paris) and Journalism After Snowden: The Future of the Free Press in the Surveillance State (Columbia University Press, 2016, with Emily Bell).
- I am currently writing a book with Emily Bell on Silicon Valley, journalism and democracy, which is in contract with Yale University Press and will be published early 2019.
- I have recently published two reports on the state of journalism. The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Re-engineered Journalism with Emily Bell, and Shattered Mirror: News, Democracy and Trust in the Information Age, on which I was a research principal.
- I am working on a range of projects on the ethics, civic impact and governance of emerging technologies, in particular AI and platforms. Three recent opeds in the Global and Mail outlines some of this work, Ethics and governance are getting lost in the AI frenzy and ‘Fake news 2.0’: A threat to Canada’s democracy and Is Facebook a threat to democracy?, and my Dalton Camp Lecture in Journalism details some of this work.
- I founded an international affairs media platform called OpenCanada.org. This site is an experiment in building a community at the intersection of research, journalism and public policy.
- I am the Director of The Phil Lind Initiative, a program that brings prominent public scholars to the UBC campus.
- I am working on a range of projects to do with the ethics and potential journalistic utility of virtual and augmented reality. This has included a report, Virtual Reality Journalism, and a VR documentary for Frontline PBS, Ebola Outbreak: A Virtual Journey, which won a 2016 Peabody-Facebook Future of Media Award and was nominated for a 2016 Emmy Award. This essay in the Columbia Journalism Review, Can Journalism be Virtual? explores some of the wider implications of the technology.
- I serve on the Board of Directors of the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and on the Governing Council of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
- I am a Fellow at the Public Policy Forum where I work on the state of journalism and media policy in Canada. I received the 2016 PPF Emerging Policy Leader award.
My PhD was on the concept of human security, exploring how mapping and spatially analyzing local vulnerability data can help us better understand the nature of extreme insecurity. My current personal research, however, now focuses on the intersection of digital technology, media and public policy.
I use this site as a contact point and as an aggregator of my academic work and broader writing.
A bit more officially:
Taylor Owen is Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia, a Senior Fellow at the Columbia Journalism School. He was previously the Research Director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University where he led a program studying the impact of digital technology on the practice of journalism, and has held research positions at Yale University, The London School of Economics and The International Peace Research Institute, Oslo where his work focuses on the intersection between information technology and international affairs. His Doctorate is from the University of Oxford and he has been a Trudeau and Banting scholar, an Action Canada and Public Policy Forum Fellow, the 2016 Public Policy Forum Emerging Leader, and sits on the Board of Directors of the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and on the Governing Council of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). He is the Founder of the international affairs media platform OpenCanada.org, and he is the author, most recently, of Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age (Oxford University Press, 2015) and the co-editor of The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink its Foreign Policies (University of Toronto Press, 2015, with Roland Paris), Journalism After Snowden: The Future of the Free Press in the Surveillance State (Columbia University Press, 2017, with Emily Bell) and The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Re-enginnered Journalism (Tow Center 2017, with Emily Bell). His forthcoming book on Silicon Valley, journalism and democracy will be published by Yale University Press in early 2019. His work can be found at www.taylorowen.com and @taylor_owen.
Email: taylor (dot) owen (at) gmail (dot) com
Warning: I have been largely defeated by email flow, so please feel free to send reminders and nudges when needed.
Selected writing and media (more formal list below)
On technology and global affairs:
- Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Age, Oxford University Press (Book) – download introduction
- The Violence of Algorithms, Foreign Affairs
- Quantum Leap, Foreign Affairs
- The Networked State and the End of 20th Century Diplomacy, Global Affairs
- Ethics and governance are getting lost in the AI frenzy, The Globe and Mail
- Don’t Underestimate the Implications of Quantum Technology, World Politics Review
- Towards a Whole of Government Digital Strategy, Policy Magazine
- Why governments must embrace the new global digital reality, The Globe and Mail
- The promise and peril of digital diplomacy, The Globe and Mail
- Bitcoin Is Dead — Long Live Bitcoin, Vice
- Drones don’t just kill. Their psychological effects are creating enemies, The Globe and Mail
- What can Governments Learn from Digital Disruptors? The Huffington Post and the World Economic Forum
- Coin Toss: Will blockchain undermine or buttress state power? Literary Review of Canada
- Why the U.S. should but won’t partner with hactivists Anonymous, San Fransisco Chronicle
On media and democracy:
- How Internet Monopolies Threaten Democracy (The 2017 Dalton Camp Lecture, broadcast on CBC Ideas)
- The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Re-engineered Journalism with Emily Bell, Tow Center for Digital Journalism Report
- Fakenews and Democracy, Public Salon talk
- The era of Big Tech self-governance has come to an end, The Globe and Mail
- The new rules for the internet – and why deleting Facebook isn’t enough, The Globe and Mail
- Is Facebook a threat to democracy? The Globe and Mail
- ‘Fake news 2.0’: A threat to Canada’s democracy. The Globe and Mail
- How safe are Canada’s elections from fake news on Facebook? Interview on the CBC’s Current
- Ungoverned Spaces: #Fakenews, The Rise of Algorithms, and the Next Big Challenge for Democracy, GIGI Global Forum Lecture
- Can Journalism be Virtual? The Columbia Journalism Review
- Journalism After Snowden: The Future of the Free Press in the Surveillance State, Columbia University Press (Book) download introduction
- The Shattered Mirror: News, Democracy and Trust in the Digital Age, The Public Policy Forum
- It’s time to reform the CBC for the digital age, The Toronto Star
- Virtual Reality Journalism, a Report for the Tow Centre for Digital Journalism, Columbia University
- Ebola Outbreak: A Virtual Journey, a Virtual Reality journalism project which won a Peabody Award and was nominated for an Emmy Award.
- Global Media Power, The Sage Handbook of Digital Journalism Handbook
- The New Global Journalism: Foreign Correspondence in Transition. Tow Center for Digital Journalism Report.
- Missing the Link: How the Internet is Saving Journalism
On Canadian politics and foreign policy:
- The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink its Foreign Policies, edited with Roland Paris, UofT Press (Book)
- A Transforming World, introduction to The World Won’t Wait, Roland Paris and Taylor Owen
- Between Metaphor and Strategy: Canada’s Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, International Journal
- Progressivism’s End, In Obama, both Americans and Canadians can see the promise of something new, The Literary Review of Canada.
- A World Turned Upside Down: To face an age of climate change, Twitter and counterinsurgency, Canada’s foreign policy establishment needs fresh ideas. The Literary Review of Canada
- 3D Vision: Can Canada reconcile its defence, diplomacy, and development objectives in Afghanistan? The Walrus Magazine.
- Let a commission, not broadcasters, call the shots, Globe and Mail.
On the bombing of Cambodia:
- Bombs Over Cambodia, The Walrus Magazine
- Historical Mapping and the US Bombardment of Cambodia, Ignite Presentation
- Roots of U.S. Troubles in Afghanistan: Civilian Bombing Casualties and the Cambodian Precedent, Asia Pacific Journal
- Sideshow? A Spatio-Historical Analysis of the US Bombardment of Cambodia, 1965-1973
On Human Security:
- Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, Security Dialogue
- Editors Introduction: Human Security. Four Volume Sage Major Work (Book)
- Human Security: A Contested Concept, The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies (Book)
- The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience, International Affairs
- The Critique That Doesn’t Bite: A Response to David Chandler’sHuman Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark’, Security Dialogue
- Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security, Disarmament Forum
- Why Human Security, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations
- Measuring Human Security: Methodological Challenges and the Importance of Geographically Referenced Determinants, in Environmental Change and Human Security
On the future of think tanks:
- Better Think Tanks, Better Foreign Policy, OpenCanada.org
- With think tanks on the ropes, Canada is losing its bark and bite, Globe and Mail
- Decline in Canadian think tanks couldn’t come at worse time, Toronto Star
Books and Manuscripts
- Disruptive Power: The Crisis of the State in the Digital Era. March 2015, Oxford University Press, New York (About, Amazon)
- The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink its Foreign Policies, Forthcoming December 2015, (ed., with Roland Paris), University of Toronto Press, Toronto (Amazon)
- Journalism After Snowden, Columbia University Press (ed with Emily Bell and Jennifer Henrichson), February 2017. (CUP)
- The New Global Journalism: Foreign Correspondence in Transition. Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia University, 2014 (ed with Ann Cooper) pdf
- Human Security. Sage Major Work, Four-Volume Set. London, UK. 2013. Link
- The Handbook of Human Security, Routledge Press, 2013 (ed., with Mary Martin) Link
- Operationalizing Human Security: From Local Vulnerability to International Policy, DPhil Thesis, The University of Oxford, July 2010.
Peer Reviewed Academic
- Belair-Gagnon, Valerie, Taylor Owen and Avery E. Holton. “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Journalistic Disruption: Perspectives of Early Professional Adopters.” Digital Journalism, vol. 5, no. 10, 2017, pp. 1-14, https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1279019.
- Owen, Taylor. “The Networked State and the End of 20th Century Diplomacy.” Global Affairs, vol. 2, no. 3, 2016, pp. 301-307, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2016.1239375.
- Burgess, J Peter, Taylor Owen and Uttam Kumar Sinha. “Human Securitization of Water? A Case Study of the Indus Water Basin.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 29, no. 2, 2013, pp. 382-407, https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2013.799739.
- Martin, Mary, and Taylor Owen. “The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience.” International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1, 2010, pp. 211-224, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2010.00876.x.
- Travers, Patrick, and Taylor Owen. “Between Metaphor and Strategy: Canada’s Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” International Journal, vol. 63, no. 3, 2008, pp. 685-702, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200806300316.
- Owen, Taylor. “The Critique that Doesn’t Bite: A Response to David Chandler’s ‘Human Security: The Dog That Didn’t Bark’.” Security Dialogue, vol. 39, no. 4, 2008, pp. 445-453, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010608094038.
- Benini, Aldo, Taylor Owen and Håvard Rue. “A Semi-Parametric Spatial Regression Approach to Post-War Human Security: Cambodia 2002-2004.” Asian Journal of Criminology, vol. 3, no 2, 2008, pp.139-158, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11417-008-9056-1.
- Liotta, P.H., and Taylor Owen. “Why Human Security?” Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. 7, no. 1, 2006, pp. 37-54, http://taylorowen.com/Articles/Owen%20and%20Liotta%20-%20Why%20Human%20Security.pdf.
- Liotta, P.H., and Taylor Owen. “Sense and Symbolism: Europe Takes On Human Security.” Parameters, vol. 36, no. 3, 2006, pp. 85-102, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/06autumn/liotta.pdf.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, et al. “Conflicts over Shared Rivers: Resource Wars or Fuzzy Boundaries?” Political Geography, vol. 25. no. 4, 2006, pp. 361-382, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.02.004.
- Owen, Taylor. “A Response to Edward Newman: Conspicuously Absent? Why the Secretary-General Used Human Security in All but Name.” St Antony’s International Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 2005, pp. 37–42, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26227009.
- Owen, Taylor, and Olav Slaymaker. “Toward modeling regionally specific human security using GIS: case study Cambodia.” AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment, vol. 34, no.6, 2005, pp. 445-449, https://doi.org/10.1579/0044-7447-34.6.445.
- Owen, Taylor. “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition.” Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 3, 2004. Pp. 373-387, https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010604047555.
- Owen, Taylor. “Human Security: A New View of Cambodian Vulnerability.” Cambodia Development Review, vol. 7, no. 2, 2003, pp. 9-16, https://www.cdri.org.kh/publication-page-old/pub/cdr/2003/cdr03-2.pdf.
- Kiernan, Ben and Taylor Owen. “Iraq, Another Vietnam? Consider Cambodia.” The United States, Southeast Asia, and Historical Memory, edited by Mark Pavlick. Common Courage Press, Forthcoming, July 2018.
- Owen, Taylor. “Global Media Power.” The Sage Handbook of Digital Journalism, edited by Tamara Witschge, C.W. Anderson, David Domingo and Alfred Hermida, London, Sage Publications, 2016, pp. 25-35.
- Bell, Emily, Taylor Owen and Smitha Khorana. “Introduction.” Journalism After Snowden: The Future of the Free Press in the Surveillance State, edited by Emily Bell and Taylor Owen, with Smitha Khorana and Jennifer Henrichsen, Columbia University Press, 2016, pp. 1-18.
- Paris, Roland, and Taylor Owen. “Introduction: A Transforming World.” The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink Its International Policies, edited by Roland Paris and Taylor Owen, University of Toronto Press, 2016, pp. 3–19.
- Paris, Roland, and Taylor Owen, “Conclusion: Imagining a More Ambitious Canada.” The World Won’t Wait: Why Canada Needs to Rethink Its International Policies, edited by Roland Paris and Taylor Owen, University of Toronto Press, 2016, pp. 175–188.
- Martin, Mary, and Taylor Owen. “Introduction.” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 1-15.
- Owen, Taylor. “Human Security Thresholds.” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, London; New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 58-65.
- Owen, Taylor. “Human Security Mapping.” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, London; New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 308-319.
- Martin, Mary, and Taylor Owen. “Conclusion.” Routledge Handbook of Human Security, edited by Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, London; New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 331-335.
- Owen, Taylor. “Editor’s Introduction: Human Security.” Human Security, edited by Taylor Owen, London, Sage Publications, 2013, vol 1, pp. xxiii-xlix.
- Owen, Taylor, and Emily Paddon. “Whither Humanitarian Space? The Costs of Integrated Peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” Modern Warfare: Armed Groups, Private Militaries, Humanitarian Organizations, and the Law, edited by Benjamin Perrin, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2013, pp. 267-287.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Missing the Link: How the Internet is Saving Journalism.” The New Journalism: Roles, Skills, and Critical Thinking, edited by Paul Benedetti, Timothy Currie, and Kim Kierans, Toronto, Edmund Montgomery Press, 2010.
- Owen, Taylor. “In All but Name: The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN.” Rethinking Human Security, edited by Moufida Goucha and John Crowley, Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell Press, 2008, pp. 113-127.
- Owen, Taylor. “Critical Human Security: A Contested Concept.” The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, edited by J. Peter Burgess, Oxford, Routledge, 2010, pp. 39-50.
- Owen, Taylor. “Measuring Human Security: Methodological Challenges and the Importance of Geographically-Referenced Determinants.” Environmental Change and Human Security: Recognizing and Acting on Hazard Impacts, edited by Peter Liotta, Springer NATO Science Series, 2008, pp. 35-64.
Non-Peer Reviewed Journals
- Kiernan, Ben, and Taylor Owen. “Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications.” The Asia Pacific Journal, vol. 13, no. 16, no. 3, 2015, pp. 1-9.
- Owen, Taylor, and Ben Kiernan. “Roots of U.S. Troubles in Afghanistan: Civilian Bombing Casualties and the Cambodian Precedent.” The Asia Pacific Journal, vol. 8, issue 26, no. 4, 2010, https://apjjf.org/-Taylor-Owen/3380/article.html.
- Owen, Taylor, and Ben Kiernan. “Bombs over Cambodia: New Light on US Air War.” The Asia Pacific Journal, vol. 5, issue 5, 2007, https://apjjf.org/-Ben-Kiernan/2420/article.pdf.
- Burgess, Peter J., and Taylor Owen. “Editors’ Note.” Introduction to “Special Section: What is ‘Human Security’?” edited by Peter J. Owen and Taylor Owen, Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 3, 2004, pp. 345- 346, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010604047569.
- Owen, Taylor. “Challenges and Opportunities for Defining and Measuring Human Security.” Disarmament Forum, no. 3, 2004, pp. 15-24, https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/UNIDIR_pdf-art2138.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor. “Measuring Human Security: Overcoming the Paradox,” Human Security Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3, 2003, http://www.taylorowen.com/Articles/2003_Paradox.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor. “Body Count: Rationale and Methodologies for Measuring Human Security,” Human Security Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 3, 2002, http://www.taylorowen.com/Articles/2002_%20Body%20Count.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor, and Robert Gorwa. “Quantum Leap: China’s Satellite and the New Arms Race.” Foreign Affairs, 7 Sept. 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-09-07/quantum-leap.
- Owen, Taylor. “Can Journalism Be Virtual?” Columbia Journalism Review, Fall/Winter 2016, https://www.cjr.org/the_feature/virtual_reality_facebook_second_life.php.
- Owen, Taylor. “Towards a Whole of Government Digital Strategy.” Policy Magazine, July/August 2016, pp. 6-8, http://www.policymagazine.ca/pdf/20/PolicyMagazineJulyAugust-2016-Owen.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor. “Coin Toss: Will Blockchain undermine or buttress state power?” The Literary Review of Canada, July 2016, http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2016/07/coin-toss/.
- Owen, Taylor. “The Violence of Algorithms: Why Big Data Is Only as Smart as Those Who Generate It.” Foreign Affairs, 25 May 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-25/violence-algorithms.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Liberal Baggage: The national party’s greatest burden may be its past success.” The Literary Review of Canada, May 2012, https://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2012/05/liberal-baggage/.
- Owen, Taylor. “A World Turned Upside Down: To face an age of climate change, Twitter and counterinsurgency, Canada’s foreign policy establishment needs fresh ideas.” The Literary Review of Canada, December 2010, http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2010/12/a-world-turned-upside-down/.
- Eaves, David and Taylor Owen. “Progressivism’s End: In Obama, both Americans and Canadians can see the promise of something new.” The Literary Review of Canada, September 2008, http://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2008/09/progressivisms-end/.
- Owen, Taylor, and Emily Paddon. “Rattle and Hum: Hello, Baghdad! A Kurdish singer rocks Iraq.” The Walrus Magazine, 21 Jan. 2009, https://thewalrus.ca/2009-01-music-2/.
- Owen, Taylor, and Patrick Travers. “3D Vision: Can Canada reconcile its defense, diplomacy and development objectives in Afghanistan?” The Walrus Magazine, 12 Jul. 2007, https://thewalrus.ca/2007-07-foreign-affairs/.
- Owen, Taylor. “One Step Closer to an Obama-Ignatieff Continent.” The Prospect Magazine, 10 Dec. 2008, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/world/one-step-closer-to-an-obama-ignatieff-continent.
- Owen, Taylor, and Ben Kiernan. “Bombs Over Cambodia: New information reveals that Cambodia was bombed far more heavily than previously believed.” The Walrus Magazine, 12 Oct. 2006, https://thewalrus.ca/2006-10-history/.
- Bell, Emily and Taylor Owen, with Peter Brown, Codi Hauka and Nushin Rashidian. The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Reengineered Journalism. The Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia University, 2017, http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/The_Platform_Press_Tow_Report_2017.pdf.
- The Shattered Mirror: News, Democracy and Trust in the Digital Age. The Public Policy Forum, 2016, https://shatteredmirror.ca/wp-content/uploads/theShatteredMirror.pdf.
- Aronson-Rath, Raney, Milward, James, Owen, Taylor and Fergus Pitt. Virtual Reality Journalism. The Tow Centre for Digital Journalism, Columbia University, 2015, https://towcenter.gitbooks.io/virtual-reality-journalism/content/.
- Cooper, Ann and Taylor Owen, editors. The New Global Journalism: Foreign Correspondence in Transition, The Tow Center for Digital Journalism, Columbia University, 2014, http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-New-Global-Journalism-1.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor. Media, Technology and Intelligence. The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), 2013.
- Owen, Taylor. Disruption: Foreign Policy in a Networked World. Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation Position Paper, 2012, http://www.trudeaufoundation.ca/sites/default/files/canada_in_the_world–en.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor, and Alexandre Grigsby. In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks in Guyana. A Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2012, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP11-Guyana.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor, and Rudyard Griffiths. The People’s Debates: A Report on Canada’s Televised Election Debates. Aurea Foundation, 2011.
- Owen, Taylor, and Emily Paddon. The Challenges of Integrated Peacebuilding in Afghanistan. Report for the Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2009.
- Owen, Taylor. The Uncertain Future of Human Security in the UN. UNESCO Working Paper, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2008.00629.
- Travers, Patrick, and Taylor Owen. Peacebuilding While Peacemaking: The Merits of a 3D Approach in Afghanistan. UBC Centre for International Relations Security and Defense Forum Working Paper, no. 3, 2007, https://www.academia.edu/148897/Peacebuilding_While_Peacemaking_The_Merits_of_a_3D_Approach_in_Afghanistan.
- Jackson, Thomas, Marsh, Nicholas, Owen, Taylor and Anne Thurin. Who Takes the Bullet? The Impact of Small Arms Violence. Norwegian Church Aid, 2005, https://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/contentassets/c1403acd5da84d39a120090004899173/2005/who-takes-the-bullet.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor, and Aldo Benini. Human Security in Cambodia: A Statistical Analysis of Large-Sample Sub-National Vulnerability Data. The Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004, https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/GICHD-resources/rec-documents/CambodiaOwenBeniniSummaryWithMap040419.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor, Kathryn Furlong, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. Codebook for the shared river basin GIS and database. The Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004, https://files.prio.org/files/projects/Codebook%20for%20The%20Shared%20River%20Basin%20GIS%20and%20Database.pdf.
- Owen, Taylor. “Data governance in the digital age: How Facebook disrupted democracy.” The Financial Post, 25 May 2018, http://business.financialpost.com/opinion/data-governance-in-the-digital-age-how-facebook-disrupted-democracy.
- Owen, Taylor. “The era of big tech self-governance has come to an end.” The Globe and Mail, 11 Apr. 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-era-of-big-tech-self-governance-has-come-to-an-end/.
- Owen, Taylor, and Ben Scott. “The new rules for the internet – And why deleting Facebook isn’t enough.” The Globe and Mail, 2 Apr. 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-new-rules-for-the-internet-and-why-you-shouldnt-delete-facebook/.
- Muggah, Robert, and Taylor Owen. “So, the liberal order is in freefall? Not so fast.” The Globe and Mail, 10 Jan. 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/so-the-liberal-order-is-in-free-fall-not-so-fast/article37566760/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Is Facebook a threat to democracy?” The Globe and Mail, 19 Oct. 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/is-facebook-a-threat-to-democracy/article36661905/.Greenspon, Edward and Taylor Owen. “’Fake news 2.0’: A threat to Canada’s democracy.” The Globe and Mail, 28 May 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/fake-news-20-a-threat-to-canadas-democracy/article35138104/.
- Ananny, Mike, and Taylor Owen. “Ethics and governance are getting lost in the AI frenzy.” The Globe and Mail, 30 Mar. 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/ethics-and-governance-are-getting-lost-in-the-ai-frenzy/article34504510/.
- Owen, Taylor, and Elizabeth Dubois. “It’s time to reform the CBC for the digital age.” The Toronto Star, 1 Feb. 2017, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2017/02/01/its-time-to-reform-the-cbc-for-the-digital-age.html.
- Owen, Taylor. “What can governments learn from digital disruptors.” World Economic Forum, 6 Apr. 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/what-can-governments-learn-from-digital-disruptors/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Why governments must embrace the new global digital reality.” The Globe and Mail, 10 Apr. 2015, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/columnists/why-governments-must-embrace-the-new-global-digital-reality/article23876924/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Why the U.S. should but won’t partner with hactivists Anonymous.” San Francisco Chronicle, 1 May 2015, https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Why-the-U-S-should-but-won-t-partner-with-6235020.php.
- Owen, Taylor. “The promise and peril of digital diplomacy.” The Globe and Mail, 9 Jan. 2015., https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-promise-and-peril-of-digital-diplomacy/article22375462/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Bitcoin is dead— Long live bitcoin.” Vice News, 23 Mar. 2014, https://news.vice.com/article/bitcoin-is-dead-long-live-bitcoin.
- Muggah, Robert, and Taylor Owen. “Decline in Canadian think tanks couldn’t come at a worse time.” The Toronto Star, 9 Oct. 2013, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/10/09/decline_in_canadian_think_tanks_couldnt_come_at_worse_time.html.
- Owen, Taylor. “Drones don’t just kill. Their psychological effects are creating enemies.” The Globe and Mail, 13 Mar. 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/drones-dont-just-kill-their-psychological-effects-are-creating-enemies/article9707992/.
- Muggah, Robert, and Taylor Owen. “With think tanks on the ropes, Canada is losing its bark and bite.” The Globe and Mail, 10 Oct. 2013, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/with-think-tanks-on-the-ropes-canada-is-losing-its-bark-and-bite/article14795496/.
- Griffiths, Rudyard, and Taylor Owen. “Let a commission, not broadcasters, call the shots.” The Globe and Mail, 1 Apr. 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/let-a-commission-not-broadcasters-call-the-shots/article574867/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Afghan army: If you build it, who will come?” The Globe and Mail, 6 Sept. 2011, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/afghan-army-if-you-build-it-who-will-come/article627066/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Why Wikileaks will lead to more secrecy, not less.” Maclean’s Magazine, 29 Nov. 2010, https://www.macleans.ca/general/why-wikileaks-will-lead-to-more-secrecy-not-less/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Review: The Canadian Century: Moving out of America’s shadow, by Brian Lee Crowley.” The Globe and Mail, 10 Aug. 2010, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/review-the-canadian-century-moving-out-of-americas-shadow-by-brian-lee-crowley/article4324559/.
- Owen, Taylor. “Five reasons British coalition is not a harbinger for Canada.” The Globe and Mail, 14 May 2010, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/five-reasons-british-coalition-is-not-a-harbinger-for-canada/article4319053/.
- Griffiths, Rudyard, and Taylor Owen. “Learning from Britain’s three great debates.” The National Post, 1 May 2010, http://nationalpost.com/opinion/rudyard-griffiths-and-taylor-owen-learning-from-britains-three-great-debates.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “How about real Liberal renewal?” The Toronto Star, 20 Nov. 2008, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/2008/11/20/how_about_real_liberal_renewal.html.
- Travers, Patrick, and Taylor Owen. “2011 is a date, not a goal.” The Toronto Star, 5 Apr. 2008, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/2008/04/05/2011_is_a_date_not_a_goal.html.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Failed strategy connects Afghan fields, city streets.” The Toronto Star, 7 Dec. 2007, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/2007/12/07/failed_strategy_connects_afghan_fields_city_streets.html.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Kandahar deal breakers: The Afghan poll is not a blank cheque.” The Globe and Mail, 2 Nov. 2007, https://eaves.ca/2007/11/02/kandahar-deal-breakers-op-ed-in-globe-and-mail/.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Africa is not a Liberal idea.” Embassy Magazine, October 3, 2007.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Iraq suddenly appears on Canada’s radar screen.” Toronto Star, 29 Aug. 2007, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2007/08/29/iraq_suddenly_appears_on_canadas_radar_screen.html.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Blogosphere at age 10 is improving journalism.” The Toronto Star, 30 Jul. 2007, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/2007/07/30/blogosphere_at_age_10_is_improving_journalism.html.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Getting back on track in Afghanistan.” The Toronto Star, 23 Feb. 2007, https://www.thestar.com/opinion/2007/02/23/getting_back_on_track.html.
- Eaves, David, and Taylor Owen. “Beyond Vimy Ridge: Canada’s other foreign-policy pillar.” The Globe and Mail, 18 Apr. 2007, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/beyond-vimy-ridge-canadas-other-foreign-policy-pillar/article1073930/.